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20 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
decision of points (1) and (2) should be welcome. As a corol-
lary to point (2) it may be asked: If T, domiciled in Pennsylvania,
bequeaths specific stock in an Ohio corporation to A, domiciled out-
side of Pennsylvania, and, by the laws of Ohio, such a bequest is
effective irrespective of the laws of Pennsylvania, can Pennsylvania
levy any tax upon the bequest? Or, perhaps, in the case of any
specific bequest of foreign stock, would not this be true, as of for-
eign chattels, even though the law of Ohio recognizes the succession
law of Pennsylvania to the same extent as in the case of chattels?
JAMES PARKER HALL.
COURTS-JURISDICTION TO VACATE ORDER OF ADoPTION AFTER
TERM.-[Indiana] A filed a petition in B County for the adoption
of a minor child.1 The petition alleged that the child's mother was
dead, but that an adoptive father was still living. The written con-
sent of the adoptive father was filed as required by the statute. The
court entered an order of adoption. Two weeks later and within
the term at which the order of adoption was made, C, the guardian
of the child, filed a verified application asking leave to appear as
amicus curiae for the purpose of presenting certain facts which he
believed would lead the court to vacate the order of adoption. The
court entered an order that notice be given to A of the filing of the
petition by C, and that the court would hear the petition on the first
day of the next term of the court. A appeared on the first day of
the next term and filed a motion to strike from the files the petition
of C. This motion was over-ruled and C was then given leave to
appear as amicus curiae. A refused to introduce any evidence.
After considering the facts alleged in the petition of C, and on a
reconsideration of the evidence originally given, the court found
the facts set forth in the application of C to be true, and vacated
the order of adoption: held, that the judgment vacating the order
of adoption was void for the reason that the petition of C was not
sufficient to keep the matter in fieri, and the court lost jurisdiction
of the proceedings at the close of the term.2
A judgment rendered at one term of court can not be modified
or vacated at a subsequent term of court, unless the proceedings are
kept in fieri by the filing of a motion for a new trial or a motion to
modify or vacate-the judgment.8
The instant case holds that the guardian was not a proper or
necessary party to the adoption proceedings 4 and that, therefore, the
filing by him of a petition to be heard as amicus curiae was not
sufficient to keep the proceeding in fieri so as to give the court juris-
diction of the matter at a subsequent term.
On the principal point, Nichols, J., dissented, upon the ground
that the court should, under the circumstances of the case, hold
that the filing of the petition by the guardian was sufficient to keep
the petition in fieri. The peculiar circumstances of the case to
1. (1914) Under Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat., secs. 868-872.
2. In re Perry (Ind. Aip.) 148 N: E. 163.
3. McClellan et al. v. Binkle.v 78 Ind. 502..
4. Following Shirley v. Grove et al. 51 Ind. App. 17, 98 N. E. 874.
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which the dissenting judge refers are the facts alleged in the peti-
tion of the guardian, which were not controverted, to the effect
that he had been duly appointed guardian by the Probate Court of
M County; that he had no notice or knowledge of the adoption
proceedings until A had demanded the possession of the child; that
A had no permanent home other than a boarding house and she
intended to place the child in a home in Chicago among strangers to
the court; that the adoptive father was a resident of G County,
Indiana, and that his consent to the adoption was procured by the
payment of money.
It is submitted that on the principal point the minority opinion
is correct, although the reasons given are not very convincing. It is
curious that neither the majority nor the minority opinion cites the
Indiana statute, the interpretation of which must necessarily con-
trol the decision of the case. The statute is very inclusive and pro-
vides that any matters pending at the end of the term of any court
which are undetermined, shall stand continued until the next term.5
The question as to whether or not the court shall enter an order
of adoption is largely within the discretion of the court,6 and at any
time within the term the court might have vacated the order of adop-
tion for any reason which came to its attention.7
It would seem, therefore, that the filing by the guardian of the
petition to appear as amicus curiae to present certain facts to the
court for the proper determination of the matter and the order
of the court issuing a notice to the parties fixing the date of hearing,
put before the court the question as to whether or not the judgment
should be allowed to stand, and that the question, although presented
in an informal manner, was a matter which was undisposed of at
the end of the term, and which was, therefore, continued to the
following term within the meaning of the statute. That is, the
petition of the amicus curiae is in effect the petition of the court.
There is a peculiar force to this in view of the fact that the
judge himself was the only person who could effectually remon-
strate against the order of adoption, and it is not stretching the
facts to say that by ordering a hearing on the petition, the court
took under advisement the review of his prior discretionary deci-
sion.
The majority of the court goes on to decide that the trial
court had jurisdiction of the adoption proceedings and that, there-
fore, the original order of adoption was valid. This was decided
in answer to the guardian's argument, as amicus curiae in the Appel-
late Court, that the original order 'was void.
Having decided that the guardian was not a necessary or proper
party to the adoption proceedings, and could only act as amicus
curiae either in the trial court or the Appellate Court, it is difficult
to see how that particular question was presented to the Appellate
5. (1914) Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat., sec. 1447.
6. (1914) Burns' Ann. Ind. Stats., sec. 870; Leonard v. Honisfager 43
Ind. App. 607, 88 N. E. 91.
7. McClellan et al. v. Binkley 78 Ind. 503.
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Court for decision; that is, unless it was conceded by the court and
all of the parties that in the event the original order of adoption was
void, the court had power at a subsequent term to vacate the void
order. There appears to be no Indiana case upon this exact point,
but undoubtedly that is the law."
Courts also have inherent power to vacate judgments after the
term if fraud was practiced in their procurement; 9 although there
are cases to the contrary."
There is an Indiana case which would seem to be almost con-
clusive upon the last proposition and which is not cited by the
court." This case holds that the point of fraud in the procurement
of an adoption can be raised in a..habeas corpus proceeding for the
possession of the child, and that after several years have elapsed, the
court is bound to vacate the order of adoption. This particular
case had to do with fraud in the publication of notice against a
moiher whose residence was in fact known to the adoptive parent,
but it would seem that the fact-alone that the consent of the adop-
tive parent in the instant case was obtained by money, would like-
wise be a fraud upon the court.
The guardian's argument was that since the fact of residence
by the minor in the county in which the petition is filed was juris-
dictional, the original order was void, for it appeared on the face
of the proceedings that the residence of the child was in G County
with its adoptive father and not in B County with the guardian.
The court held that in view of the fact that the original petition
alleged that the child "was in the care and custody of C, as guar-
dian, at this home in B County," it was presumed that the petitioner.
at the time of the hearing for adoption, introduced evidence sufficient
to justify the court in finding that the residence of the guardian
was the residence of the. child. The case of Shirley v. GroVe 2 is
cited as authority for this proposition, but that .case was one where
the petition expressly alleged that the minor was a resident of the
county in which the proceedings were started, and where the court
held that the attack on the proceedings was collateral.
But the instant case does hold that' the facts required by
the statute to be alleged in the petition of adoption are jurisdictional
and must appear upon the face of the petition. 8 It is submitted
that the allegation of the petition to the effect that the child was in
the care and custody of her guardian at his home in B County, is
wholly insufficient as an allegation that her residence was in R
County when it also appeared on the face of the petition that an
adoptive father lived in G County.
8. Bronson v. Schulten 104 U. S. 410, 26 U. S. (L. ed.) 797; Bank of
United States v. Moss 6 How. 31, 12 U. S. (L. ed.) 331; Wetmore v. Karrick
205 U. S. 141, 51 U. S. (L. ed.) 745.
9. Edson v. Edson 108 Mass. 590, 11 Am. Rep. 393.
10. Sharp v. Danville etc. 105 N. C. 308, 11 S. E. 530, 19 Am. St. Rep.
533.
11. Glausman v, Ledbetter 190 Ind. 505, 130 N. E. 230.
12. 51 Ind. App. 17. 98 N. E. 874.
13. Citing Watts v. Dull 184 Ill. 86. 56 N. E. 303, 75 Am. St. Rep. 141;
Kennedy v. Borah 226 11. 243, 80 N. E. 767.
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An adoptive parent requires the same control over a child which
a natural parent has,14 and the domicil or residence of a minor is
that of his adoptive father. 5 As between the father and the guar-
dian, the Indiana statute says:
"Every guardian so appointed shall have the custody and tuition
of such, minor-provided that the father of such minor (or if there be
no father, the mother, if suitable persons respectively) shall have the
custody of the person and the control of the education of such minor."16
To reach its conclusion the court must presume, first, that the
guardian's home in B County was his residence; and, second, that
the minor was in the care and custody of the guardian by reason
of an order of a competent court awarding the care and custody
of the minor to the guardian as against her adoptive father, because
the father was not a suitable person. But the law is, that no pre-
sumptions are indulged in favor of the court's jurisdiction; the facts
necessary to establish it must appear on the face of the record.' 7
A man may have more than one home in the common sense
of the word and still not be a resident of a particular county within
the meaning of the statutes using that word.' s This fact does not
seem to have troubled the court, nor does it say anything about the
further question as to the right of the guardian to change the resi-
dence or domicil of the minor from the county in which he was
appointed guardian. Hiestand v. Kuns'9 holds that the power of
the guardian to change the domicil of his ward is not unlimitedV°
Hammond, Ind.
BERNARD C. GAvIT.
INSURANCE-PRovING WAIVER OF PROOF OF LOSS UNDER AN
ALLEGATION OF PERFORMANCE OF CONDITIONS PRECEDENT.-[Illi-
nois] In accordance with the general tendency to treat contracts of
insurance as things apart, certain courts have relaxed the strict rules
of common law pleading in dealing with them. German Fire Insur-
ance Company v. Grunert' has long been cited as enunciating the
rule that in insurance cases, proof of a waiver of a condition prece-
dent could be made under an allegation of performance of that con-
dition. In Hart v. Carsley Manufacturing Co.,2 decided several
years later, the Illinois Supreme Court had before it a question of
much the same nature, but in a building contract case. Instead of
14. (1914) Burns' Ann. Ind. Stats., sec. 871.
15. Miller v. Bode (Ind. App.) 139 N. E. 456.
16. (1914) Burns' Ann. Ind. Stats, sec. 3065.
17. Watts v. Dull 184 Ill. 86, 56 N. E. 303, 75 Am. St. Rep. 141; Fur-
geson v. Jones 17 Ore. 204, 20 Pac. 842, 11 Am. St. Rep. 808, 3 L R. A. 620.
18. Estopinal v. Michael 121 La. 879, 46 So. 907, 19 L. R. S. (N. s.) 759.
19. 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 345, 46 Am. Dec. 481.
20. See also 12 Rul. Case Law P. 1121 sec. 22.
1. (1884) 112 IIl. 68; 1 N. E. 113. It should be noted that certain
proofs of loss were actually furnished, although their insufficiency was urged
by the insurer. Some cases make a distinction between situations where no
proofs are furnished, and where there are insufficient proofs.
2 (1906) 221 Ill. 444; 77 N. E. 897.
